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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports the results of one attempt to introduce an 
obj ective , quantitative, scientific mechanism for making allocational 
regulatory decisions . The case is the allocation of UHF television 
stat ions among cities by the Federal Communications Commission. The 
mechanism is an experiment which is designed to reveal the preferences 
of the subj ects with respect to alternative allocations . Pilot 
experiments were performed on FCC staff, the purposes of which were to 
refine the experimental design and instructions and to provide data 
for comparing different specifications of the final estimated equation . 
Participating in the final experiment were six FCC commissioners ,  nine 
members of the Commission's congressional oversight committee , and 
eleven members of the staffs of both group s .  
Data collected from these experiments have been fitted to 
theoretical stochastic models of qualitative choice behavior to obtain 
estimates of allocation preferences as a function of market 
characteristics . These preference functions are then used (a) to 
check the coherence of preferences across individuals ; (b ) to examine 
differences in policy objectives between congressional oversight 
committees and the regulatory agency ; (c) to determine whether 
individual preferences can be aggregated into a social decision 
function with normatively compelling propert ies , such as consistency 
with individual preferences or maj ority-rule equilibrium; and (d) to 
test the sensit ivity o f  committee decisions to voting institutions 
and alternative agendas . 
In Search of Scientific Regulation : 
The UHF Allocation Experiment 
by 
Forrest Nelson and Roger Noll 
The explicit purpose of regulatory agencies is to produce an 
allocation of resources that differs from the allocation that would 
result from unfettered private transactions . Presumably the resulting 
allocation is supposed to reflect socially important values that would 
otherwise be treated inadequately by private parties . 
A maj or problem that faces anyone , including the regulator , 
who seeks to evaluate the allocation that results from a regulatory 
policy is to place values on the consequences of alternative actions . 
Regulators are rarely in the happy position of facilitating society's 
move to an allocation that is unambiguously superior (e . g .  s trictly 
Pareto dominant) . Instead, some will lose and some will gain , and 
opinions will differ on which allocation is preferable . 
Both political and economic reasoning provides a very 
pessimistic point of view on the ability of regulators to assemble 
convincing proof that their allocations , if not perfect , are at least 
preferable to some reasonable alternatives . Whether the decision­
rule is market simulation through benefit-cost analysis or maj ority 
rule voting, theory teaches us that without placing restrictions on 
preferences or assigning social values to the income of each person, 
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definite conclusions about the relative values of Pareto noncomparable 
positions cannot be reached . 
Nevertheless , regulators are hired to make these allocations , 
and the search for a calculus for evaluating their decisions continues .  
Moreover , it is always possible that the distribution o f  people 
according to preferences and of the consequences of a particular 
decision are regular enough so that normatively interesting comparisons 
can be made. 
This paper reports the results of one attempt to introduce an 
obj ective , quantitative , scientific mechanism for making allocational 
regulatory decisions . The case is the allocation of UHF television 
stations among cities by the Federal Communications Commission. The 
mechanism is an experiment which is designed to reveal the preferences 
of the subj ects with respect to alternative allocations . Pilot 
experiments were performed on FCC staf f ,  the purposes of which were to 
refine the experimental design and instructions and to provide data 
for comparing different specifications of the final estimated equation . 
Participating in the final experiment were six FCC commissioners , nine 
members of the Commission ' s  congressional oversight committee , and 
eleven members of the staffs of both groups .  To our knowledge this 
is the first instance in which decisionmakers at this level have been 
willing to permit the collection of preference data on such an 
important issue of public policy. 
Data collected from these experiments have been fitted to 
theoretical stochastic models of qualitative choice behavior to obtain 
estimates of allocation preferences as a function of market 
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characteristics . These preference functions are then used (a) to 
check the coherence of preferences across individuals; (b) to examine 
differences in policy objectives between congressional oversight 
committees and the regulatory agency; (c) to determine whether 
individual preferences can be aggregated into a social decision 
function with nonnatively compelling properties , such as consistency 
with individual preferences or majority-rule equilibrium; and (d) to 
test the sensitivity of committee decisions to voting institutions 
and alternative agendas . 
The paper is organized as follows . Section I describes the 
allocational problem of the FCC that motivates the search for a 
scientific decision-making mechanism. Section II presents the basic 
microeconomic and econometric models that motivate the design of the 
experiment. Section III contains a detailed description of the 
experiment . The empirical findings from the experiments are reported 
in Section IV. Section V presents the analysis of alternative 
preference aggregation rules , and Section VI offers a brief summary 
and conclusion . 
I .  THE STATION ALLOCATION PROBLEM 
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One of the principal responsibilities of the Federal 
Communications Commission is to define and allocate rights to use the 
electromagnetic spectrum for communications purposes. Among the many 
claimants to this scarce resource are television broadcasters , and 
since the early 1950s the FCC has reserved a large portion of the 
spectrum for their use .  Except for some possibility of tinkering 
at the margins , this element of spectrum allocation -- the 
reservation of a part of the spectrum for broadcasters -- has 
been resolved . A second element is still a live issue . This 
is the allocation of channel assignments to particular localities.  
Because nearly all VHF channel assignments have been made and are 
being used , the maj or task is to allocate the largely unused UHF 
spectrum, although the FCC is also investigating the technical 
feasibility of adding a few more VHF channel assignments as well . 
Exactly why the FCC and Congress want to use administrative 
mechanisms to allocate television stations among cities is a m�tter of 
some dispute and controversy . A definitive treatment of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper . Suffice to say here that the policy 
derives from the "local service" doctrine , which holds that each 
community ought to have an "equitable" amount of locally controlled broad­
casting outlets if it is large enough to make local stations 
economically viable .1 
Whatever the just ification , a maj or task of the FCC is to 
decide the maximum number of television stat ions that will be allowed 
to operate in each community. This task has three elements. 
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The first is to determine which allocations are technically 
feasible. The FCC seeks to make station signals receivable in the 
community in which they are located , but weak enough so that the same 
channel and the channels adj acent to it can be used in as many other 
communities as possible. The variables under the control of the FCC 
to affect signal reception are the antenna height , signal power , and 
signal direction of a station and the geographic spacing between 
stations . For several years the FCC has used a computer program to 
generate alternative allocations that are technically feasible and 
that satisfy some other standards of service , such as maximizing the 
proport ion of the population that can receive some minimum number of 
local stations. 
A second element of the allocation problem is to determine 
whether a particular station allocation is economically viable . One 
obj ective of the FCC is to allocate stations in such a way that as 
many as possible are claimed and used by broadcasters . To select one 
city over another for an additional station assignment serves no 
useful purpose if only in the latter city could an additional station 
generate enough revenue to operate. Because stations are required to 
report financial information to the FCC ,  some data are available for 
estimating the financial viability of additional stations , and since 
mid-197 6  the FCC has been working on a financial model of UHF viability 
that will be incorporated into the technical allocat ion model. The 
result will be a model that generates alternative allocations that are 
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technically feasible and economically promising. 
The final part of the allocation problem is to choose among 
the alternative technically and economically feasible solutions . One 
dimension that affects the choice , by virtue of the local service 
doctrine , is the pattern of existing allocations among communities. 
Presumably the quantitative impact of local service is to work towards 
equalization of viewing options across communities . Another dimension 
is the number of people to benefit from an allocation , as measured by 
the population served by a station. This would tend to work against 
the local service doctrine by allocating more stations to larger 
cities than to smaller ones. Still another aspect of the problem is 
to decide what kind of station to create .  The FCC decides directly 
whether a station will be commercial or noncommercial . Within each 
category it also decides indirectly what kind of programming will be 
broadcast by virtue of the pat terns of programming that develop as 
stations are added to a market .  For example:  
• The first three VHF commercial allocations (or, with 
fewer than three commercial VHF stations , the first
three commercial stations) will affiliate with a 
network; 
• Independent commercial VHF stations , because of signal 
reception advantages , will outbid commercial UHF 
stations for the best programming that is not provided 
by the three major networks , so that the type and quality 
of programming on an additional UHF station depends on 
whether its independent competition is from V's or other 
U ' s ;  
• Second or third noncommercial allocations, because 
of the scarcity of programming available for them, 
will focus on rerunning programs from the national 
noncommercial network and providing very inexpensive, 
discussion-oriented local programs . 
With respect to commercial stations , the access to 
television advertising by local merchants (in comparison with 
national and regional businesses) will be affected by the number 
and spectrum location of commercial outlets . An advantage of 
local UHF commercial independents in the eyes of the FCC is that 
they provide an inexpensive advertising outlet for local business 
that enables them to compete more effectively with larger firms . 2 
Multiple stations also foster "political competition" in local 
7 
affairs by increasing the number of independent points of view that 
can be given access to channels . Finally , the heterogeneity of the 
community may affect the desirable number of allocations to it.  To 
the extent that tastes in programs are related to cultural background , 
additional stations might provide more benefits to communities with 
a diverse ethnic background , by providing more specialized programs 
for each group , than to a homogeneous community . 
For these and other reasons , political decision-makers 
have preferences among alternative station allocations that would 
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not be fully accounted for if allocations responded only to measures 
of the economic performance of a station. In recognition of this , 
the FCC authorized an exploratory study to determine whether and to 
what extent noneconomic aspects of allocation policy could be 
incorporated into the computer program that generates technically 
and economically feasible allocations . The idea3 was to question 
a panel of "wise people" outside the FCC , including some members 
of Congress and some informed citizens , about their opinions 
concerning alternative allocations and to develop some mechanism that 
would convert these opinions into collective decisions about the 
relative value of alternative allocations . 
From the perspective of the FCC ,  an automated decision­
making process based upon a sample of informed opinions has two main 
advantages . First , a process that simultaneously allocates a large 
number of stations conserves decision-making effort by a very busy 
Commission that otherwise would have to assign stations on a city-by­
city basis after hearing a potent ially large number of opinions on the 
comparative advantages of Keokuk and Dubuque as homes for another UHF 
television outlet . Second , a process based on a survey of politically 
responsible and representative subj ects provides a mechanism for 
making concrete the rather vague legislative directions to the FCC 
with respect to spectrum allocation . Whatever allocational policy 
emerges from the proces s ,  the resulting allocations would have an 
element of polit ical legitimacy with Congress , the courts and potential 
appellants from allocation decisions that would be missing from a 
decision based solely on the opinions of commissioners . Thus , 
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automated allocations based upon a variety of external opinions allow 
the FCC to make quick and inexpensive decisions that may reflect some 
consensus values and that are less likely to be turned aside by 
Congress or the courts . 
Whether the idea of computerizing an ultimately political 
decision is practical is another matter. First ,  it is not obvious 
that meaningful, coherent information about peoples' preferences 
over alternative allocations can be collected. Second , once collected , 
it is not clear that these preferences are sufficiently harmonious 
that they can be aggregated in a nonarbitrary way and represented 
functionally in a computer program . These are the questions to be 
addressed in this paper. We attack the problem with a healthy 
skepticism that anything interesting and useful will result . 
II . THE MODEL 
As noted in the previous section, the purpose of the experi-
ment is to gather information regarding allocation preferences . The 
most useful preference information is for a single individual and refers 
to the assignment of a single new station . The individual's preferred 
allocation can then be constructed from successive assignment of single 
stations , and questions regarding allocation preferences of a group can 
be answered by considering the individual preferences of group members . 
The first step , then, is the specification of a theoretical model of 
qualitative choice behavior . The model we propose is adopted from the 
random utility model developed by McFadden . 4 
Consider the behavior of an individual who is asked to assign 
a new station to one of M competing markets and to specify a "type" 
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restriction (commercial or non-commercial) on that_ assignment.  The 
person ' s  choice is between 2•M qualitatively distinct possible 
outcomes. Assignment preferences are assumed to depend on observable 
characteristics of the M markets , the current allocation of stations 
to each of the markets , and some unobservable factors that are assumed 
to be random. A plausible description of choice behavior is that a 
person assigns a numerical preference score to each of the 2•M 
alternatives , the value of that score being determined by the market ,  
allocation and random factors noted above , and then chooses the 
assignment that receives the highest score . 
A formal descript�on of such behavior appears as follows : 
(1) sij � fj (Pi , Ai , uij ) 
(2) 
'1i = {: 
if sij > si'j ' for all (i' ,j') � ( i , j ) ,  
i '
otherwise , 
l ,  • • .  ,M, j '  = 1 , 2  
where the subscript i denotes market ( i  = 1 ,  2 ,  . . •  , M) ; the superscript j 
denotes type (j =l for commercial , 2 for non-commercial) ; Sij is the
preference score for market i ,  type j; Pi is a description of 
characteristics of market i; Ai is a description of the current 
allocation of frequencies to market i, (i . e . , an itemization of the 
number of commercial UHFs , non-commercial UHFs , commercial VHFs and non-
commercial VHFs ) ;  U . .  is a random variable representing unobservable1J 
factors affecting the value of Sij ; and Yij is an indicator for the 
preferred assignment . Implicit in the specification of equation (1) is 
the assumption that the score S .. assigned to market i is independent 1J 
of scores Si ' j ' for any other market i '  �i and that differences between 
markets are reflected only through the factors Pi, Ai and Uij' not 
through differences in the form of fj. The function fj 
may differ 
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across types j, and, because Sil and si 2  both depend on the same factors, 
Pi and Ai' they need not be independent, allowing for substitutability 
between station types within the same market. 
It would be unrealistic to expect individuals to reveal their 
preference scores Sij. Indeed, the model does not even require conscious 
assignment of numerical values. It merely requires that the choices be 
consistent with the assignment of numerical values in the following sense : 
there exists a function f .  and a distribution on the random variable Ui. J J 
that correctly predicts the relative frequency of outcomes Yij as the 
assignment task is repeated indefinitely. The preference scores are 
in a sense an artificial construct, and do not necessarily have any 
natural interpretation or meaning. (Two suggestive interpretations 
are the perception of an individual about the increment to "social 
welfare" resulting from a new assignment and the magnitude of the 
deviation of the current allocation, Ai, from some "target" allocation. ) 
The scores merely provide a convenient measure of preferences among 
alternatives. For example, given either estimates or knowledge of 
the functions f
j
, specific values of Pi and Ai determine expected 
scores S .. that rank-order all alternative assignments. 1J 
The presence of the random component Uij 
implies that Sij 
and, in turn, Y .. will be random variables with distributions derived 1) 
from that of uij" 
That derived distribution for Y .. provides a basis 1J 
for the estimation of parameters from a sample of observations on the 
Yij and the exogenous variables Pi and Ai. In principle, the choice 
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probabilities (Pr(Yij = llPi, Ai), i 
= 1 • . .  , M, j = 1,2) may be derived 
given any specific functional form for fj and any distribution on Uij. 
But arbitrary specifications will lead to choice probabilities which 
exhibit undesirable properties and are computationally cumbersome. 
We assume that the random term enters additively, 
fj(Pi, Ai, uij) = fj(Pi, Ai)+ uij 
and that the Uijs follow independent and identical Weibull distributions: 
Pr(Uij ! ulAi, Pi) exp (-exp (-u)). 
This yields choice probabilities of the logistic form : 5 
(3) Pr (Yij llAi, Pj) 
M 2 
exp(f.(Pi, Ai)) / L L exp(fj,(P.,, Ai,)). J i'=l j'=l 1 
The form of f
j
(Pi, Ai) is assumed to be : 
I 
(4) sij = fj (Pi, Ai
) + uij 
= ej xi+ uij' 
where Xi is a k element vector of observable constants which are obtained 
from predetermined functions of Pi and Ai.
6 Now equation (3) for choice 
probabilities can be written as 
(5) Pr(Yij llPi, Ai) 
I M 2 
exp(8j Xi) I L L exp(8 ., Xi,). i'=l j '=l J 
The choice probabilities in equation (5) are in the form 
required for the conditional logit model used extensively in econometric 
analysis of qualitative choice behavior. Maximum likelihood may be used 
for estimation of e . •  j = 1, 2, given a random sample of observations on J 
yij and xi. 
III.  THE STATION ALLOCATION EXPERIMENT 
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The general structure of the station allocation experiment is 
that it asks a subj ect to make a sequence of station allocations among a 
group of cities that differ in population and their initial allocations . 
Although the original intent was to include ethnic diversity as well as 
population as a variable separating cities, incorporat ing these variables 
made the game too complex to satisfy two highly binding design constraints: 
The statistical techniques that were employed, require a large number of 
observat ions, and the experiment could take no more than a few minutes 
if cooperation was to be obtained from the subj ects, most of whom were 
highly placed government officials. 
Although several forms of the experiment have been used, 
the following discussion describes the version that was used for 
the Commissioners, Congressmen and some high level staff members. The 
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and noncommercial variety (Table 1). The subject is told that in 
any city the first three VHF commercial allocations (or the first
three commercial stations if there are fewer than three VHF 
commercial allocations) will be network affiliates, and the rest 
of the commercial stations will be independents. The experimenter 
then gives the subj ect four tokens representing VHF stations, and 
a very large number of UHF tokens . The subj ect is told to begin 
allocating additional stations , in order of the subject's conception 
of the relative value of the alternatives, among the four cities . 
An allocation is made by placing a VHF or UHF token in one of the 
7 two station categories in one of the four cities. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
earlier variants were a�plied to some staff, and had different The subject proceeds to allocate stations until one of two events 
ranges of variation in independent variables and in the number of 
factors that were allowed to influence allocations . The final 
form of the experiment was based on experience gained from the 
earlier trials . The complete set of instructions to subj ects 
and experimenters for the final version is contained in Appendix A. 
At the beginning of the experiment, a subj ect is confronted 
with an existing allocation to four cities. The subject is shown 
a game board which indicates the population of the area served by 
stations in each city and the number of stations already on the air 
in each of four categories : UHF and VHF stations of the commercial 
occurs. If the subj ect believes that no more channels serve a useful social 
purpose, the subject announces that the experiment is over. Otherwise, the 
subj ect is told that the experimenter will call the experiment to a halt in 
a few minutes, based upon a random decision rule that is unknown to the 
subj ect .  In practice, experimenters were told t o  stop the experiment after 
about twenty allocations or after about two minutes, whichever occurred 
first . The number of UHF tokens available to the subject was much larger 
than the maximum number of choices that could be made with this rule. The 
intent of the stopping rule is to reinforce the instructions that each 
TABLE 1: SAMPLE INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR STATION ALLOCATIONS 
Market A B c 
Population 5 , 000, 000 1 , 5 00 , 000 400 , 000 
Comm. NoncollllU . Collml. Noncomm. Comm. Noncomm. 
VHF 3 1 3 0 2 1 
UHF 1 0 1 1 1 0 
TOTAL 4 1 4 1 3 1 
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D 
100 , 000 
Comm. Non comm. 
2 0 
0 0 
2 0 
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assignment is to be the best available alternative and not to be one 
element of an unordered set of several, essentially simultaneous 
allocations . Only in this case will the set of assignments satisfy 
the characteristics of a random sample that are assumed in the 
8 theoretical model and for the statistical procedures. 
The original plan was to have each subj ect go through the 
allocation experiment four times, each time with different initial 
conditions in terms of city populations and original allocations. But 
early experimental results indicated that in some cases this would 
provide too few allocations to support statistical determination of 
the underlying preference relation of the subj ect. The problem was 
that a surprisingly large minority of subj ects did not like television 
and would stop allocating more stations after only a handful of allo­
cations. Thus, the number of times the experiment was run on each 
subj ect was made a variable, and the experimenter was instructed to 
rerun the experiment enough times with varying initial conditions 
to generate at least fifty choices . 
One feature of the experiment is that, for all but the first 
assignment in a run of the experiment, the initial conditions for any one 
choice are determined by the subj ec�s previous allocations . This generates 
variance in the variables measuring the pattern of allocations that 
enter the scoring function as independent variables . Meanwhile, each 
time the experiment is run the population of the cities remains constant 
during all of the allocations . Populations are changed only when 
a run of the experiment is stopped and the subj ect is given a new 
set of initial conditions for the next experiment . 
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Another feature of the experiment is the absence of 
direct incentives to the subjects . To pay subj ects was impossible 
because they occupy positions in either the agency that paid for 
the experiments or the congressional subcommittee that authorizes its 
budget . In any case , there is no natural way to construct payoffs 
to subj ects while retaining the essential features of the FCC ' s  
allocation problem. A few well-publicized scandals to the 
contrary , FCC and congressional decision-makers do not receive 
direct monetary payoffs for allocation decisions . In terms of 
designing an experiment that parallels reality, the problem in 
experimental design that this creates is that there is no reason 
to believe that the responses reveal true preferences . This should 
introduce no particular bias into the results , but it may make them 
essentially observations on random variables rather than the result 
of rational comparisons . 
Two features of the experiment could counteract the tendency 
to give random, poorly considered answers. One is that subj ects were 
told the truth about the purpose of the experiment , which is that the 
subj ect's responses may be used to make real allocations. Stressing the 
importance of the exercise may induce the subj ect to take the experiment 
more seriously. The second is that the experiment was designed to be 
enjoyable. This required creating an interesting task in an interesting 
setting , and designing an experiment that is fast-moving and of short 
duration . The extent to which these elements succeed is measured by 
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the consistency of the choices made by the subj ect . Were the responses 
random, the estimated decision model would not explain the decisions 
that were made. 
Although the authors administered the experiment a few times , 
most of the data were collected by two staff members of the FCC who 
were assigned to the UHF Task Force . The authors trained both in 
experimental techniques , and one of them was present during several 
experiments administered by the authors . 
The experiment was administered in the following way. First, 
the experimenter read a short , general statement to the subj ect about 
the purpose of the experiment , and answered any questions that the subj ect 
asked in response to this statement . Second , the subj ect was given a 
detailed set of instructions , which the subj ect then read. The subject 
could ask questions of the experimenter during this reading. Third, 
the experimenter and the subj ect together made some hypothetical alloca­
tions. Fourth , when the experimenter was convinced that the subj ect 
understood how to perform the allocation tasks, the first set of initial 
!conditions and a set of station tokens were given to the subj ect, and 
the first iteration was begun . 
The final stage of the process was an interview, after the 
last iteration of the experiment was completed . The purpose of the 
interview was to provide some additional information that was thought to 
&e valuable by the FCC staff, such as the reactions of subjects to the 
experiment and their opinions on whether other factors, such as ethnic 
diversity, would have affected the allocations. Because the interview 
took place after the subject made allocations , and because the 
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experimenters were instructed not to discuss the issues covered in the 
interview with the subj ect except to answer specific factual questions 
until the interview was underway, experimenter influence on allocation 
decisions was minimized. Nonetheless, the likelihood is small that 
experimenter influence was avoided altogether because of the impossibility 
of keeping two experts on communications policy from discussing matters 
of mutual interest for the first thirty minutes of their conversation. 
The experimenter was given a standard form for recording 
information from the experiment, as shown in Appendix A. The allocation 
data were collected by the experimenter, who wrote down the allocations 
of the subj ect as they were being made. Occasionally subj ects allocated 
stations faster than the experimenter could write them down in which 
case the experimenter asked the subj ect to delay the next allocation or 
to repeat the last one. Usually the rate at which stations were 
allocated was slow enough so that experimenters had no difficulty 
recording the subj ect's decisions. 
Experimental subj ects were selected in the following way. 
All seven FCC Commissioners and fifteen members of the House Sub-
committee on Communications were asked to be subj ects. One Commissioner 
and six Representatives refused. Included in the sample are Commissioners 
Brown, Ferris, Fogarty, Lee, Quello and White, and Congressmen Brown, 
Core, Mikluski, Moore, Moorhead, Moss, Skubitz, Stockman and Van Deerlin. 
The staff members selected as subj ects included assistants to four 
additional Congressmen (Murphy, Russo, Waxman and Wirth), three members 
of the staff of the House Subcommittee, two members of the staff of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Communications, and two FCC staff -- the General 
20 
Counsel and the Assistant to the Chairman. Four congressional staff 
responses were not used in the analysis because of problems in the 
experiment or because the data were given to us too late to be 
incorporated in the analysis. All subjects were promised that the 
results of the experiment would be presented in such a way that their 
responses could not be matched to their names. 
IV. ESTIMAT ING PREFERENCE RELATIONS
The data generated by an experiment on a single subj ect 
consist of (a) the initial conditions (population and allocation 
of stations in each of M markets) for each trial and (b) the 
sequence of new frequency assignments within each of the trials. 
The current allocation in all markets upon which each new 
assignment is based can readily be calculated from t?he' ·initial 
allocation and the sequence of preceding assignments, which 
represent increments to the allocation. Each subj ect participates 
in several trials which have different initial allocations and 
populations for the four markets. If the data for all trials on 
one subj ect are combined, and if T is the total number of new 
assignments made in all trials, then T observations (t=l, . . •  ,T) 
are collected on each of the following variables : 
ytij Indicator of assignment made 
(Y . .  = 1 if assignment was to market i, t� 9 type j ,  and zero otherwise.) 
21 
p ti : Population in market i. 
CUti : Number of commercial UHF stations in market i.
cvti : Number of commercial VHF stations in market i.
NUti : Number of noncommercial UHF stations in market i. 
NVti : Number of noncommercial VHF stations in market i.
(i=l, • . .  ,M, j=l,2) 
These data are used to estimate, for each subject, the 
conditional logit model of choice behavior described in Section II. 
For ease of reference, the essential elements of that model are 
repeated here. Let Ati = [CU ti, CV ti, NU ti, NV ti], Xti be a vector 
valued function of P .  and A i' P {P .,i=l, M}, A ={A ., i=l, ... , M},ti t t ti t ti 
and Y ={Y ij , i=l, • • . , M, j=l,2} , and recall that U i" is the t t t J 
unobserved random variable. The unobserved preference scores 
Stij are assumed to be determined by
5tij 
= 8; xti + utij 
and the logistic choice probabilities appear as 
M 2 
Pr(Yt IP t' At)= 11 11 i=l j=l 
[ 
exp (8� X i) ]
Y tij 
J t 
M 2 , 
l: l: exp(8.,Xti ' ) 
1= 1 j'= 1 
J 
The vectors 81 and 82 are the parometers to be estimated. 
Though Pti and Ati contain only five components, these 
components may be combined in various ways in the specification of 
Xti to pick up linear, nonlinear, and interactive effects of
population and allocation. Unfortunately the underlying theory of 
allocation decisions does not yield a precise specification of the 
scoring function and the limited number of observations for each 
subject rules out the option of a subject-by-subject empirical 
2 2  
search for the "best fitting" model. To avoid the potential danger 
of "overfitting" the data, the bulk of experimentation with alternative 
specifications used data from the pilot experiments. Moreover, the 
same model was applied to each subject, and variables were added 
or deleted only if that change uniformly improved the fit across all 
pilot subjects. The result of that study was a model which included 
nine variables and seventeen coefficients. Finally, the model was 
fitted to the data obtained from the subjects of most interest, 
commissioners, Congressmen and high level FCC and Congressional 
staff members. Variables were eliminated from the model at this 
stage to the extent possible without sacrificing predictive power. 
The list of variables so obtained is contained in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Except for the constant term x1, the independent variables 
in the model vary across markets and change from one assignment to 
the next. They are constant across type but enter the preference 
scores Stij with different coefficient weights, 8j
. Let 8
jk 
be the 
weight assigned to variable k in the score for a type j assignment. 
The nature of the model and fewness of noncommercial assignments 
create an identification problem among the 8jk's. To deal with this 
problem 8 21 was normalized at zero, and the following constraints 
xl 
DUMMY 
x 2 
tfCO M UHF 
x3 {/CO M VHF 
X4 #NON-CO M 
x5 POP/II STA 
XG POPULAT ION 
x7 LOG POP 
XB NETWOR K 
TABLE 2 
LIST OF EXOGENOUS VAR IABLES 
A constant term introduced to allow for gross 
preference differences between commerical and 
noncommercial assignments. 
The number of commercial UHF stations (CU)
currently allocated. 
The number of commercial VHF stations (CV). 
23 
The number of noncommercial stations (NV+ NU). 
Population divided by total number of stations. 
Market population (P) (in millions). 
Natural log of (population + 1). 
Dummy variable for Networks (1 if fewer than 
three commercial stations, 0 otherwise). 
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were imposed: 8 22  = 8 23 and 828 = O. Thus there remain in the model 
eight variables and thirteen identifiable coefficients. 
Coefficient estimates for six collllllissioners, nine members 
of Congress, and seven staff members are presented in Tables 3, 4 ,
and 5 ,  respectively. Significance tests must be treated with some 
caution, given the small sample sizes and the fact that the model 
was arrived at by some searching over alternative specifications. 
But overall the fit for each subject is reasonably good. The psuedo 
2 A 
R s, computed as l-L(8)/L(8=0) where L is the log likelihood, are 
nearly all above .4, values generally considered large for logistic 
models. The entries in the row labeled Chi�S<l are -2 [L(8 = 0) - L(�)] 
and may be used to test the hypothesis that assignments are purely 
random, an hypothesis which is resoundingly rejected for all subjects. 
The estimated coefficients can be used to predict the rank ordering 
across all eight alternatives (four markets by two types) at each 
assignment. As indicated in the next to last row in the tables, 
between 55 percent and 97 percent of the actual assignments made by 
a subject were predicted by the model as being the first or second 
choice. 
[TABLES 3, 4, 5 HERE] 
The estimates suggest relations between preference scores 
and the other variables that are plausible. For example, the effect 
of increasing the number of stations of a given type in a particular 
market should be to decrease the preference score for another 
assignment of that type, an effect which holds uniformly across both 
subjects and types of assignments.10 The direction of the effect of 
TABLE 3 
. 
LOGIT HODEL COEFFICil!IOT ESTIMATES POR SIX COMMISSIONERS 
Variable 
COMMERCIAL SCORE COEFFICIENTS 
Dummy <Sul 
I Com-UHF ( Sl2) 
U Com-VHF Cs13l
fl Non-Com (S14l
Pop/I/ Sta (S15J 
Population (616) 
Log Pop (S17l 
NETWRK (B15l 
NON-COMMERCIAL SCORE COEFFICIENTS 
I Com UHF & VHF CS22" S23l 
O Non-Com (821) 
Pop/II Sea CB25l 
Population (826) 
Log Pop (827) 
Chi-Sq 
(dF) 
R2 
% 1-20• 
% 3-4***"' 
XVII 
-2 .8906 (-1.5266)
-2. 7346 (-5.4033)
-2.8059 (-4 .4935)
-2.9876(-4.587) 
-1.8951 (-0.9935)
-0.3381(-0. 732)
5.6186)( 4.2634)
0.5429 ( o. 7947)
-1.5018 (-2.3709)
-7 .4841 (-6. 7672)
-2 .0191(-0.591) 
-0.3155 (-0.4U3)
3.787 ( 2 .0983)
97. 
170.21(13)
.42 
79 
15 
XVIII 
4. 7435 ( 1.6483)
-3. 764 (-5.2204)
-2 .8916 (-3. 7873)
0.1618 ( 0.2936)
1.3406 ( 0.6152)
-0.5463)(-1.1201)
2.1516 ( 1.5353)
1.5364 ( 1.3531)
-0.6835(-0.87) 
-6.1992(-5.001)
-2 .3069 (-0.3751)
-0.8001 (-0.6562)
5.8052 ( 2.67U)
75. 
141.52(13)
.45 
84 
SUBJECT 
XX.II""* 
o. 
NA 
-3.9349 (-5.315) 
XX III 
1. 7652 ( 0.5427)
-1.4686 (-3.0352)
-3.9046 -1.483 (-4.6637) (-2.486)
-1.2154 -o. 7496 (-1. 7693) (-1.1058)
-2.407 6.3571)(-1.2658) ( 1.5862)
-2.244 -1.1809 (-3. 9999) (-2. 0353)
11. 5731 2. 7253 ( 5.2638) ( 1. 7042)
2.0927 0.3376 ( 2. 7923) ( 0.4696)
0.5679 1.0191 ( 0.8019) ( 0.9888)
-13.5325 -10. 7792 (-5.2364) (-4.5922)
o. 3.0542 
NA ( 0.343) 
o. -1.2421 
NA (-0.9251) 
-0.4436 4.228 (-0.5027) ( 1.2456)
67. 
150. 762(10) 
.55 
81 
15 
74. 
133.027(13) 
.43 
72 
26 
XXVIII 
3.4733 ( 1.3457)
-3.3189(-5.492)
25 
l!XIX 
8.9056 ( 3.1698)
-2. 7498 (-3.8214)
-3.2568 -2.8926 (-4. 7712) (-3-2247)
-0.8579 -0.6818 (-1.5031) (-1.1261)
-1. 5296 (-0.698) 4 .7916( 1.35) 
-o. 7711 1.2732 (-1.6998) (-1.6804)
6.409 2.5314 ( 3.8157) ( 1. 7162)
2.63 1.8368 ( 2.7406) (-1.7886)
-2.0497 0.3281 (-2.6076) ( 0.4401)
-4. 0281 -4. 8844 (-4 .0915) (-4 .1315)
0.3795 9.019 ( 0.0697) ( 1.6339)
-2.1789 -2.88 (-2.0851) (-2.25)
9.8253 4.0961( 3.6621) ( 1.675)
74. 
135.442(13) 
.44 
82 u 
52. 
89.5'24(13) 
.u 
79 
13 
• Figures in parentheaea are the ratio of coefficient· estimate to estimated asymptotic at. error. 
Subject XXII made so few noncommercial a11ignment1 that the full model could not be estimated. Reported 
estimates were obtained constraining three coefficients to be zero. 
Entries indicate the percentage of actual aaaignments which vere predicted by the model as either the 
first or second choice. 
Entries indicate the percentage of actual aBBignmenta which were predicted by the model as either the 
third or fourth choice. 
COMMERCIAL SCORE COEFPICIENTS 
Dummy (Sul 
0 Com-UHF CS12l 
f Com-VHF (S13J 
I Non-Com CS14) 
Pop/fl Sta Cs15J 
Population Cs16) 
Log Pop <s17J 
NETllRK (S15> 
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TABLE 4 
LOGIT HODEL COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES POR HINE CONGRESSMEN* 
x1•• 
0. 
(NA) 
XII xx XXI 
Subject 
l!XIV 
-2.4456 7.5508 -1.0638 -0.7238(-0.9068)* (2.3599) (-0.5996) (-0.478) 
xxv XXVI XIX XXXIII 
9.0435 3.2195 7.9307 2.5789 (3.1237) (0.8969) (0.9284) (1.3153)
-4.255 -1.0616 -3.8003 -1.3356 -0.9336 -4.1121 -2.6405 -3.9461 -0.904 (-4.5263) (-1.2874) (-4.5522) (-3.4850) (-3.035) (-'i.7539) (-2.9489) (-2.3296) (-1.8016)
-3. 763 -1.6753 -3.1947 -1.1527 0.2644 -3.9444 -1.9501 -4.4616 -1.2675 (-3. 7924) (-1. 7252) (-3.4434) (-2.2298) (0.5889) (-4.0175) (-1.8492) (-2.0671) (-1.9849)
-0.5425 -4.9495 -o. 7801 0.4335 0.6519 0.0865 -0.U29 -1.8132 -0.3946 (-0.5849) (-6.1614) (-1.0896) (0.9069) (1.6852) (0.1295) (-0.1412) (-1.1149) (-0.8829)
-1.7723 -1.2865 1.7288 -4.0663 9.1582 0.0717 -2.473 -7.8841 -1.2601 (-0.583) (-0.5599) (0.3724) (-1.6946 (3.262) (0.0278) (-0.7569) (-1.0579) (-0.4156)
-1.4288 -0.8953 -0.6663 0.205 -0.6524 -1.5535 -1.2412 -0.0991 -0.6464 (-2. 0292) (-1. 3963) (-1.0686) (O .5045) (-1. 6765) (-2 .5896) (-1. 6522) (-0 .077) (-1. 3913)
9.9825 6.8267 6.8887 2.9167 -1.1638 8.0743 10.4458 15.724 4.3484 (4.038) (3.5009) (3.0399) (1.9568) (-0.9972) (3.9886) (3.3945) (2.3509) (2.3691)
0.8611 3.6033 0.7801 -0.3524 0.0382 O.U85 1.4617 0.8146 -0.0498 (0.9821) (3.4532) (0.9683) (-. 7106) (0.0715) (0.1345) (1.4898) (0.6501) (-0.0665) ----------------- --------- ------------------ ------ -NON-COMMERCIAL SCORE COEFPICIENTS 
n 
com UHF 
• 
VHF cs22 - s23> ci:g��il ,:g::gil ,g:���:l c:�::��4> c�:��i�l ,g:��:�> cg:����> c�:::��l ,g:����l
I Hon-Com ( s24) 
Pop/f Sta cs25) 
Population (826) 
Log Pop (S27) 
Chi-Sq 
(dF) 
R2 
% 1-2*** 
% 3-4···· 
-15.8693 -5.9646 -5.8775 -3.2672 -3.1233 -5.6668 -3.1205 -13.4354 -1.6928 (-4.1275) (-7.4176) (-5.0428) (-4.4533) (-'i.6975) (-5.9228) (-2.6371) (-2.1622) (-3.7266)
o. 
(NA) 
0. 
(NA) 
-1.1255 0.7696 -2.4423 -9.5284 -12.4818 3.8209 -13.2518 1.0696 (-0.5286) (0.1038) (-1.036) (-1.6809) (-2.1549) (0.7315) (-0.3793) (0.4784)
-o. 7686 -1.478 -0.9397 2.1643 -0.039 -1.5825 -2.4761 -1.2547 (-1.4406) (-1.5783) (-1.6682) (2.8336) (-0.0496) (-1.5621) (-1.3084) (-2. 7154)
2.5056 4.9696 6.3916 7.6047 -1.6943 9.7448 4.9868 21.8729 5.5829 (2.013) (3.744) (2.0265) (3.8958) (-0.7546) (3.5207) (1.2667) (0.9527) (3.2929)
55. 
145.00(10) 
.63 
69 
91. 
178.60(13) 
.so 
82 
72. 
146.66(13) 
.49 
86 
12 
79. 
87 .77(13) 
.27 
66 
20 
94. 
119 .93(13) 
.31 
68 
21 
68. 
132.23(13) 
.47 
81 
18 
39. 
77 .42(13) 
.48 
82 
15 
32. 
91.60(13) 
.69 
97 
69. 
46.22(13) 
.16 
55 
22 
* Figures in parentheses are the ratio of coefficient estimate to estimated aaymptotic at. error. 
** Subject XXI made so few noncommercial auignments that the full model cou.ld not be estimated. Reported 
estimates vere obtained constraining three coefficients to be zero. 
*** Entries indicate the percentage of actual assignment& which were predicted by the model as either the 
first or second choice. 
**** Entries indicate the percentage of actual assignments which vere predicted by the model aa either the 
third or fourth choice. 
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TABLE 5 
LOGIT MODEL COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR SEVEN STAFF KEKBERS* 
COMMERCIAL SCORE COEFFICIENTS 
DUillllly (611) 
II Com-UHF CB12) 
II Com-VHF (£13) 
H Non-Com C614l 
Pop/# Sta <e15> 
Population (616) 
Log Pop <a17l 
NETWRK (£18l 
XIII xv XVI 
0.8113 6.1177 -1.4023 
(0.4649) (1.9007) (-0. 715) 
XXVII xxx XXXI 
2.3052 4.0716 2.5015 
(1.3742) (2 .0342) (1.3638) 
XXXII 
2. 7082 
(1.1369) 
-4. 6034 -3. 7621 -1.1527 -0. 7639 -1. 8425 -2. 9223 -2 .1545 
(-5.8985) (-4.4773) (-3.6684) (-2.4141) (-3.1983) (-5.2859) (-4.1393) 
-4.9523 -4.0812 -1.1125 0.1236 -1.8777 -2.2505 -1.5705 
(-5.7541) (-4.1999) (-2.5399) (0.2659) (-2.7674) (-3.7054) (-2.6692) 
-0.8959 -1.2581 -0.3999 0.343 0.9441 0.5639 -1.2661 
(-1. 61) (-1. 5261) (-1.2221) (0. 8628) (1. 6208) (1. 2896) (-2 .5334) 
7.9769 -2.0866 -1.7586 2.1714 8.707 3.7091 -0.4076 
(2.9932) (-0.7672) (-1.0091) (1.0517) (2.4003) (1.6735) (-0.2163) 
-2. 767 0.0051 
(-4.3927) (0.0086) 
0.1043 -0.8537 -1.777 -1.1568 -0.5382 
(0.3286) (-2.0639) (-3.1921) (-2.4045) (-1.2881) 
5.4046 4.0613 2.4926 2.7665 3.2823 2.182 3.6683 
(4.1235) (2.6884) (2.3927) (2.1253) (1.9415) (1.8551) (2.9918) 
-1.8535 -0.3298 0.8794 0.4205 
(-2.1768) (-0.3647) (1.6882) (0.7877) 
0.0125 0.3165 1.5022 
(0.0174) (0.4242) (1.8674) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NON-COMMERCIAL SCORE COEFFICIENTS 
II Com UHF & VHF (622 • 6 23) 
11 Non-Com ( B24) 
N 
Pop/II Sta (S25) 
Population (626) 
Log Pop (627) 
Chi-Sq 
(dF) 
R2 
% 1-2** 
% 3-4*** 
-2.5229 
(-4 .1001) 
-0 .0718 
(-0.0846) 
-1.1141 
(-1. 7119) 
1.2834 
(2.7586) 
2.4258 
(4.0238) 
-0.6952 
(-1.6595) 
0.431 
(0. 7022) 
-6.0087 -7.8852 -4.2182 -4.065 -4.5247 -3.0329 -6.0578 
(-5.9532) (-4.6325) (-4.8772) (-5.2347) (-6.1992) (-5.4365) (-5.876) 
3.0602 -1.0772 -4.0928 
(1.0392) (-0.1668) (-0.8432) 
3. 3557 
(1.152) 
7.4774 -0.7584 -3.7659 
(2.2415) (-0.282) (-0.8942) 
-1.5743 -0.6365 0.0855 -1.9708 -1.3209 0.3652 
(0.5651) 
0 .0528 
(0.0682) (-2.1643) (-0.5997) (0.1058) (-3.0272) (-2.4603) 
4.6801 4.1319 
(2.6794) (1.8783) 
84. 
153.87 
(13) 
.44 
80 
15 
63. 
118.94 
(13) 
.45 
84 
11 
3.8457 6.1314 
(1.1985) (2.3521) 
101. 
135 .14 
(13) 
.32 
74 
21 
88. 
108.82 
(13) 
.30 
61 
28 
1. 9039 1. 5319 3. 2624 
(0.9237) (1.0333) (1.6269) 
83 
129. 79 
(13) 
.38 
70 
22 
95 
127 .58 
(13) 
.32 
82 
8 
81 
125 .82 
(13) 
.37 
73 
23 
* Figures in parentheses are rhe rat.io of coefficient estimate to estimated asymptotic st. error. 
** Entries indicate the percentage of actual assignmenrs which were predicted by the model as either the 
first or second choice. 
*** Entries indicate the percentage of actual assignments which were predicted by the model as either the 
third or fourth choice. 
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stations of one type on preference for the other type varies across 
subjects, indicating different attitudes among subjects about the 
substitutability of one type of station for the other. The NETWORK 
coefficient varies both in sign and magnitude across subjects. But 
generally it is positive, reflecting either a nonlinearity in number 
of commercial stations or a feeling that all markets ought to have 
access to all three commercial networks. 
The marginal effect of population on the preference score 
for a type j assignment is given by sjS
/S + sj6 + Sj/ CP+ l), and
the second derivative is -S
j7/(P+ l)
2, where S and P are the total 
number of stations and population in millions, respectively, in that 
market. The second derivative is negative for all but two subjects, 
suggesting diminishing marginal preference increments as population 
rises. The marginal effect of population itself tends to be positive, 
as one might expect, across both subjects and types. But rts sign 
depends on the values of both S and P, and there are ranges within 
the data for which it becomes slightly negative. 
Although there are a few exceptions, the general pattern is 
for the marginal effect of population to be essentially zero for 
larger cities but positive for smaller ones. For commercial 
assignments at the lower range of the population scale, assignment 
preferences uniformly rise with increasing population at all relevant 
levels of S. As population approaches the middle range (about 3 
million), its marginal effect diminishes uniformly across subjects 
and in some cases becomes zero or slightly negative when the number 
of stations is small. At the upper range of the population scale 
29 
(5-6 million), the marginal effect of population fluctuates around 
zero for nearly all subjects, being slightly negative at some relevant 
levels of S and slightly positive at others. A similar pattern holds 
for noncolllIDercial assignments, though there are a few more exceptions. 
What this means is that within the ranges of population and number of 
assignments included in the experiment, subjects almost always 
allocate more stations to larger cities, but they tend to place 
relatively little importance on population differences between large 
cities. This result :may be a consequence of the experimental design; 
with more stations to allocate and more variance in the size of large 
cities offered as alternatives, greater differences in allocations 
among large cities might be observed. 
Despite some anomalies noted above, coefficient estimates 
exhibit sign patterns that are consistent with intuition, but these 
qualitative effects are not global. The estimated preference score 
surfaces exhibit intuitively plausible gradients, but only within 
the range of the data, which are also within the range of current 
and proposed assignments. Caution must be exercised in extrapolating 
beyond this range. 
As further evidence of the quality of the estimates, Tables 
6 and 7 compare actual and predicted assignments for one trial (trial 
2-b) for the six FCC colllIDissioners. A prediction in this case 
represent a simulation of a full sequence of assignments, starting 
from an initial allocation. A comparison with the subjects actual 
assignment sequence illustrates how well the model "tracks" with 
actual behavior. While the tables illustrate the comparison for 
only one of six trials, the chosen trial is representative; it is 
neither the worst nor the best case for any subject. 
[TABLES 6 and 7 HERE] 
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As seen i n  Table 6 ,  through ten assignments b y  subject 
XVIII the model predicted actual assignments exactly, and the 
differences for the remaining three were relatively minor. For 
subject XXII, the model delayed noncommercial assignments to market 
D from the eighth to the tenth round and to market C from the 
eleventh to the fourteenth round. Otherwise the predictions were 
exact. Disagreements between actual and simulated assignments 
appear more severe for subject XVII . In particular the first A-C 
assignment in the simulation was dramatically delayed, relative to 
actual, and the D-N and A-N assignments at rounds 5 and 6 were 
premature. Recall, however, that the model explicity assumes 
independence of preference scores across markets but non-independence 
across types. Regarding commercial and noncommercial assignments 
to the same market as partial substitutes and ignoring the 
assignment type, simulated assignments at rounds 3, 5 and 8 came 
two rounds early, and those at rounds 12 and 15 came one round too 
early, relative to actual assignments. In this light the differences 
appear less severe. 
Though the timing differences between simulated and actual 
assignments are frequent, they are generally "made up" within a few 
assignments. The comparison in Table 6 may therefore overemphasize 
differences. Table 7 compares simulated and actual assignments from 
a different perspective to reveal this overemphasis. Entries in that 
ASSIGNMENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
TABLE 6 
* 
COMPARISON OF SIMULATED AND ACTUAL ASSIGNMENT SEQUENCE FOR SIX SUBJECTS ON ONE TRIAL 
SUBJECT 
XVII XVIII XXII XX I I I  XXVIII 
SIM ACT SIM ACT SIM ACT S IM ACT S IM ACT 
C-C C-C C-C C-C D-C D-C C-C c-c c-c c-c 
D-C D-C D-C D-C C-C c-c C-C c-c D-C D-C 
c-c B-C B-C B-C B-C B-C D-C D-C B-C B-C 
B-C A-C A-C A-C A-C A-C C-C D-C A-C A-C 
D-N C-C C-C c-c D-C D-C D-C C-C c-c c-c 
A-N C-C D-C D-C c-c C-C B-C B-C D-C D-C 
C-C D-C B-C B-C D-C D-C A-C A-C c-c B-C 
B-N C-N A-C A-C B-C D-N C-C 0-C B-C c-c 
C-N D-N C-N C-N c-c B-C C-N C-N D-C D-C 
D-C B-N D-N D-N D-N c-c 0-C B-C A-C A-C 
A-C A-N c-c B-N B-N C-N B-C A-C C-C c-c 
D-C c-c D-C A-N A-C B-N D-N C-C D-N D-C 
c-c D-C B-N c-c A-N A-C A-C D-N B -C ---
B-C B-C B-C --- C-N A-N B-C C-C A-C ---
A-C c-c A-C --
- --- --- A-C D-C 0-C ---
c-c A-C A-N --- --
-
--- B-N --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- D-C --- --- ---
XXIX 
S IM ACT 
c-c c-c 
c-c c-c 
0-C D-C 
0-C D-C 
B-C B-C 
A-C B-C 
B-C A-C 
A-C A-C 
c-c C-C 
0-C D-C 
D-N B-C 
B-C A-C 
B-N ---
A-C ---
--- ---
--- ---
--- ---
* Entries indicate an assignment of market-type where Market 
N (Non-Commercial ) .  All subj ects were FCC commissioners . 
A, B ,  C or D and Type C (Commercial) or 
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Table 7 (cont ' d) 
Market Type 
A-C A-N B-C B-N c-c 
Initial Assignment 2 1 2 1 2 
Subj ect Assignments after 
+ N Allocations 
XXIII +3 Act 2 1 2 1 4 
Sim 2 1 2 1 4 
+6 Act 2 1 3 1 5 
Sim 2 1 3 1 5 
+9 Act 3 1 3 1 5 
Sim 3 1 3 1 6 
+12 Act 4 1 4 1 6 
Sim 3 1 4 1 6 
+15 Act 4 1 4 1 7 
Sim 5 1 5 1 6 
XXVIII +3 Act 2 1 3 1 3 
Sim 2 1 3 1 3 
+6 Act 3 1 3 1 4 
Sim 3 1 3 1 4 
+9 Act 3 1 4 1 5 
Sim 3 1 4 1 5 
+12 Act 4 1 4 1 6 
Sim 4 1 4 1 6 
XXIX +3 Act 2 1 2 1 4 
Sim 2 1 2 1 4 
+6 Act 2 1 4 1 4 
Sim 3 1 3 1 4 
+9 Act 4 1 4 1 5 
Sim 4 1 4 1 5 
+12 Act 5 1 5 1 5 
Sim 4 1 5 1 5 
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C-N D-C D-N 
1 2 1 
1 3 1 
1 3 1 
1 4 1 
1 4 1 
2 5 1 
2 4 1 
2 5 1 
2 5 2 
2 6 2 
2 5 2 
1 3 1 
1 3 1 
1 4 1 
1 4 1 
1 5 1 
1 5 1 
1 6 1 
1 5 2 
1 3 1 
1 3 1 
1 4 1 
1 4 1 
1 4 1 
1 4 1 
1 5 1 
1 5 2 
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table are the number of stations by type and market after intervals 
of three new assignments. As revealed in Table 7, never do the 
actual and simulated allocations differ by more than one station in 
any market at any time . 
V. SIMULATING COMMITTEE DECISIONMAKING 
The primary intended use of the individual scoring functions 
is to determine the extent to which individual preferences can be 
aggregated to a consistent cOlll!Dittee decision. This section analyzes 
the outcome of several different methods that might be used to aggregate 
the preferences of each of the three types of experimental subjects: 
FCC commissioners, members of Congress, and staff. The groups were 
treated separately so that differences among them could be identified. 
The theoretical problem that motivates the following analysis 
is the Arrow paradox. The FCC and Congress are majority-rule 
institutions and, in general, if the preferences of individual voters 
in a majority-rule institution are randomly distributed, there is no 
equilibrium outcome to the voting process. The Arrow paradox is most 
easily demonstrated by a three-person, three-option example. Let A, 
B and C be the alternatives to people X, Y and Z ,  and let the rank-
ordering of the alternatives for each person be as follows : 
x y z 
A B c 
B c A 
c A B 
35 
If each person votes sincerely , then the outcomes of pairwise maj ority-
rule votes are : A beats B (2-1) , B beats C (2-1) , and C beats A (2-1) . 
Thus , if alternatives can be reintroduced , the process never ends . Or 
if alternatives can not be reintroduced, the decision depends solely 
on the order in which the alternatives are considered , and the final 
decision has no interesting normative properties -- that is , it is not 
necessarily better or worse than the other possible outcomes . 
Table 6 shows that FCC Commissioners do have different tastes 
with respect to allocations ,  but the preferences have some consistency 
as well. 11 For example , if the order of allocations is taken as a 
crude rank-ordering of the alternatives (which it is not exactly) , the 
maj ority rule choices on the first six rounds would be C-C , D-C ,  
B-C, A-C , C-C and D-C b y  votes o f  a t  least 5-1 , 4-2 , 4-2 , 4-2 , 5-1 and 
5-1 respectively . A cycle might arise between assignments C-C , D-C 
and B-C at round 7 ,  depending on the resolution of a tie vote . But 
such comparisons using actual allocations are invalid, since,  except 
for the very first round of any experiment ,  the current allocation on 
which choices are based differ from subj ect to subj ect . They require , 
instead , use of the scoring func tions that were estimated from the 
all"ocation data . 
Six different methods for simulating committee decisions were 
investigated through repeated use of the scoring functions . Each 
method was used to simulate experimental trial 2b . Four of the methods 
were particular forms of :maj ority-rule , while two were methods of 
adding preferences . 
Majority-Rule Method A assigned a random number to each of 
3 6  
the eight possible allocations (combinations o f  market and type) , 
and made pairwise ,  maj ority-rule comparisons of the alternatives in 
order of the magnitude of the random number assigned to them. Thus , 
the two alternatives with the highest random numbers were compared 
by maj ority-rule, and the winner was then compared with the 
alternative with the third highest random number . Because an even 
number of Commissioners were subj ects , ties occasionally occured in 
the FCC simulations ; they were resolved by declaring the alternative 
with the higher random number (which in this case is also the "status 
quo") as the winner . 
Maj ority-Rule Method B was identical to Method A except 
that the order in which the alternatives were considered was the 
opposite -- that is , the alternative considered first in Method A 
would be considered last in Method B .  Because the results of 
majority-rule decisions in the presence of an Arrow paradox depend 
on the sequence in which alternatives are considered , Methods A and 
B should produce different results if the actual preferences of 
subj ects are sufficiently nonharmonious . 
Maj ority-Rule Method C ,  which was applied only to the FCC 
Commissioners , uses still another method of sequencing the alternatives . 
The Chairman of a regulatory commission can set the agenda of the 
meetings . Thus , the sequence of Method C is the order that maximizes 
the chance that the Chairman -- Charles Ferris -- would get his first 
choice . It also resolves all ties in the Chairman ' s  favor -- that is , 
it gives the Chairman two votes if the vote would otherwise be 3-3 . 
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Maj ority-Rule Method D, which also was applied only to the 
FCC simulations , represents still another method of making allocations 
that has occasionally been used in FCC decisions . It assumes that the 
Commission first makes a decision about the market in which the station 
will be located and then , after the market is decided , votes separately 
to determine whether the station will be commercial or noncommercial . 
As in Method A, the alternatives in the first round here four 
market types were assigned random numbers , and the sequence of 
pairwise comparisons was determined by the magnitude of the random 
numbers . Ties were awarded to the alternative having the higher random 
number . 
One criticism of maj ority-rule institutions is that they 
offer no systematic way to account for intensities of preferences -­
four weak yes votes can beat three strong no votes . The Sum of Scores 
Method uses the actual scores of alternatives as measures of 
preference intensity . For each subj ect , the scores assigned to all 
eight alternatives were normalized so that the smallest score was 
zero and the remaining seven summed to one . 12 Then , for each of the 
three groups the alternative was selected for which the sum of its 
normalized score across all subj ects in that group was greatest . 
The kind of voting institution that this would approximate would be 
one in which each agent had a large number of votes and was asked 
to divide the votes among the alternatives in a way that represented 
the relative attractiveness of the alternatives . A person with weak 
preferences , then, might assign roughly equal numbers of votes to 
each, while a person with strong preferences might assign all votes 
to the most preferred option -- assuming that each voted truthfully. 
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The final method is the Pooled Data Method . In this case,  
all allocations by all subj ects in one of the three categories were 
treated as observations by a single, hypothetical decision-maker , and 
a single scoring function was estimated from these pooled data . These 
scoring functions are shown in Table 8 .  Allocations were then made 
according to the predicted scores of the eight alternatives obtained 
from this pooled preference function. 13
[TABLE 8 HERE ] 
Table 9 shows the results of the allocations for the six FCC 
commissioners according to the six different methods . Because 
simulating decisions outside the range of the data is a questionable 
procedure , the table shows the distribution of eighteen assignments 
by each method . Moreover , to give some picture of the pattern in which 
these allocations were made , the table shows the sequence of allocations 
in groups of three . Thus , the first group of entries shows the change 
in allocations after three stations had been assigned , while the second 
group of entries shows how the first six allocations were distributed . 
The results show only scattered minor differences among the allocation 
methods ,  with even the few differences being rransitory . At the end 
of eighteen assignments , all methods produce identical results . 
[TABLE 9 HERE ] 
The results are even more striking for the Congress and the 
staff.  Maj ority-Rule Methods A and B generated identical sequences 
of allocations for eighteen assignments when applied to the nine 
meIQbers of Congress , indicating that the results are insensitive to 
the particular procedures of maj ority rule applied to these subj ects . 
For staff meillbers , each group of three assignments were allocated 
identically by the two methods ,  but for one bundle -- allocations #10 ,  
TABLE 8 
POOLED DATA COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THREE GROUPS* 
Variable 
COHllERC IAL SCORE COEFFICIENTS 
Dummy CB11> 
I Com-UHF (Bl2) 
I Com-VHF (Bl)) 
I Non-Coa C B14 J 
Pop/I Sta CB1 5) 
Population (B16) 
Log Pop C B1 7) 
NETWRX CB18> 
Commissioners 
1 . 1403 
( 1 .  3808) * 
-1 . 8598 
(-9 . 7334) 
- 1 . 8538 
(-7 . 816) 
-1 . 0276 
(-5 . 2201) 
-0 . 6 399 
(-0 . 8591) 
-0 . 5601 
(-3. 2364) 
4 .0199 
(7 . 6794) 
0 . 5836 
(2 .0654) 
CROUP 
Congressmen 
0 . 2925 
( 0 . 5462) 
-0 . 5419 
(-4 . 152) 
-0 . 3608 
(-2 . 9837) 
-0 . 5563 
( -4 . 0298) 
0 .  7637 
( 1 . 1476) 
-0 . 5 706 
(-4 . 0903) 
2 . 9653 
(6 .4331) 
0. 723
( 3  .4939) 
Staff Members 
0 . 4358 
(0. 7506) 
-0 . 7 717 
(-5 .9521) 
-0 . 6 762 
(-4 .023) 
-0 .0244 
(-0 . 1 789) 
1 .7088 
( 2 . 5817) 
-0 . 6447 
(-4.4948) 
1 . 9748 
(4 .7178) 
0 . 5273 
(2 .4691) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
NON-COHHERCIAL SCORE COEFFICIENTS 
I Com UHF & VHF ( B22 • B2 3) 
I Non-Com ( e24 ) 
N 
Pop/I Sta ce2 5J 
Population ( 826) 
Log Pop (827 ) 
Chi-Sq : H ** 
(dF) o 
Chi-Sq : H *** 
(dF) p 
-0 . 8727 
(-3.  7925) 
-3 . 9461 
(-1 1 . 7005) 
-0 . 8655 
(-0.4924) 
-0 . 9 1 35 
(-2 . 5814) 
4 . 6972 
( 5 . 2357) 
439 
558 . 73 
( 1 3) 
261 . 76 
(65) 
-0 .0126 0 . 0156 
(-0 . 1026) ( 0 . 1132) 
-1 .0413 -1 . 9891 
(-6 . 9117) (-10 . 7011 ) 
1 . 6602 0 . 9797 
( 2 .0662) ( 0 . 9996) 
-0 . 5477 -0 . 4172 
(-3 . 1148) (-1 . 9031) 
1 .  7044 1 . 5356 
( 3 . 042) ( 2 .4738) 
599 595 
296 . 1 7  408.04 
(13) ( 1 3) 
729 . 30 491 . 9 1  
(104) ( 78) 
• Entriee in parentheaes are the ratio o f  coefficient est imate to asymptotic 
l!l t .  error . 
** H0 ls the null hypothe111a that assignments are random . 
*** HP 
is the hypotheaie that the decision rules ( t rue coefficients) are the 
same for all members within a group . 
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#11 and #12 � the ordering was different . All other allocations were 
identical through eighteen assignments .  
Obviously , the various methods produce no important differences 
in allocations within each group . Despite the differences in the 
sequences of allocations that different subj ects would make , their 
preferences are sufficiently harmonious that , when several consecutive 
allocations are made, their differences apparently are resolved . This 
suggests that although each group (especially the Commissioners) might 
face difficulty in making a decision about where to put the next 
station, it would probably face less of a problem in deciding how to 
allocate a large number of stations . 14 
To check the robustness of these findings , the results of 
the FCC connnittee decisions were simulated a second time with a 
five-member Collllllission . To maximize the chance of get ting a 
different result , the Collllllissioner that was deleted was selected 
because he was at the extreme in the allocations that he made during 
the experiment . His preferences exhibited the weakest correlation 
between allocations and population , the greatest preference for 
nonconnnercial stations , and the poorest measures of statis tical fit 
for the scoring function -- that is , either the functional form 
represented his actual decisions least well , or his preferences were 
were most subj ect to random error. The results of these simulations 
were virtually identical to the results of the six-person simulation . 15
Thus , the results appear to be robust to fairly significant changes 
in the composition of the group . 
Although the allocations made by each group are not sensitive 
to changes in decision-making procedures , the three groups did not 
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produce the same pattern of assignments . Indeed, there are some 
interest ing differences among the three groups . Table 10 shows the 
pattern of assignments according to Maj ority-Rule Method A for the 
six Connnissioners , nine members of Congress , , and seven staff members . 
After eighteen allocations , the Congress simulation had assigned two 
more stations to the largest city and one fewer station to each of 
the two smallest cities than had the FCC simulation. The staff results 
are intermediate. Apparently the Congress is more sensitive to 
population differences than is the Commission , perhaps reflecting 
the population basis on which the Congress is elected . 
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
A second difference is the greater taste of Congress for 
noncollllllercial television . After eighteen assignments , the Congress 
had allocated two more stations to noncollllllerical use than had the 
Commissioners , with the staff again being in the middle . This 
particular phenomenon has many potential explanations . Perhaps the 
greater expertise of the FCC may give the Collllllissioners a better 
'sense of the problems of noncollllllercial UHF outlets in acquiring 
programming and achieving economic viability . 
VI . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The motivation of the research reported here was an attempt , 
on the part of the FCC ' s  UHF Task Force , to incorporate a consideration 
of subj ective preferences in an automated scheme for the allocation 
of UHF channel assignments to localities . The feasibility of that 
task depends on a sufficient consistency of preferences across 
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TABLE 10 
COMPARISON OF ALLOCATIONS BY THREE GROUPS* 
Market /Tl:ee ** 
A B c D 
ff Allocated Grou:e c N c N c N c N 
+3 FCC +2 +l 
Congress +2 +l 
Staff +2 +l 
+6 FCC +l +l +2 +2 
Congress +3 +l +2 
Staff +l +l +2 +2 
+9 FCC +l +2 +3 +3 
Congress +l +l +3 +l +2 +l 
Staff +l +2 +2 +1 +2 +l 
+12 FCC +2 +2 +3 +l +3 +1 
Congress +1 +2 +4 +2 +2 +1 
Staff +2 +2 +l +3 +1 +2 +1 
+15 FCC +3 +1 +2 +1 +3 +1 +3 +l 
Congress +2 +2 +l +4 +2 +3 +1 
Staff +2 +l +2 +l +4 +1 +3 +1 
+18 FCC +3 +1 +3 +1 +4 +l +4 +1 
Congress +2 +1 +2 +1 +5 +2 +3 +2 
Staff +2 +1 +3 +1 +4 +2 +4 +1 
*Entries in one row indicate the distribution across the eight market-type 
alternatives of the specified total # allocated as simulated for a committee
representing the specified group , using maj ority rule A as the decision rule . 
**Initial Assignment : Two C ' s  and one N in each market . Populations : A = . 2 ,  
B = . 4 ,  C = G . O ,  D = l . 8 .  
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individuals to allow for aggregation into a social decision function 
and on the ability to elicit relevant preference information and 
summarize it in a quantifiable form amenable to computer implementation . 
These were the two key issues addressed here . 
The mechanism employed for eliciting preference information 
was an experimental simulation of a station allocation task. The 
resulting data were used to estimate a logistic model of qualitative 
choice behavior , and the resulting preference function estimates were 
used to measure consistency across individuals and robustness across 
alternative aggregation rules . Whether the experimental subj ects 
actually took the experiment seriously enough to make choices that 
more than crudely reflect their true preferences can only be 
conj ectured . But the results of the analysis reported here indicate 
that something fairly consistent and rational underlies the data that 
were collected . Moreover , the stability of the simulations with 
respect to changes in institutional rules suggests that apparent 
differences between subj ects within each group are substantially 
!mitigated by the coarseness of the discrete choices involved . Yet 
differences between groups do exist . Although the differences are 
not dramatic , the congressional subj ects appear to favor somewhat 
greater allocations to larger cities and to noncommercial outlets 
than do the Commissioners . 
Our initial skepticism about the likely success of automation 
of a major part of the FCC ' s  allocation decisions has been considerably 
softened by these results . Obviously, in a real policy-making 
environment caution should be exercised in too strict a reliance on 
allocations made by the method reported here . But we would argue 
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that such a process could be effectively used to generate a tentative 
table of allocations , and that such a table might be found quite 
satisfactory by the Commission with little or no amendment .  
Finally , we should emphasize the generality o f  the methods 
examined here. This paper has focused on the specific case of 
spectrum allocation by the FCC . But the procedures are applicable 
to many situations in which a decision-making body is faced with a 
large number of subj ective and relatively expensive or time-consuming 
decision s .  College admissions , merit scholarship awards ,  licensing 
decisions and contract awards are a few examples . 
FOOTNOTES 
*Part of the research reported here was financed by the Federal 
Communications Commission . We are grateful to Raymond Wilmotte for 
suggesting the project and encouraging its continuation , and to Gail 
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Crotts and Alan Stillwell f o r  carrying out the experiments .  O f  course ,  
this report reflects the views o f  the authors , and should not b e  attributed 
to the Federal Communications Commission, the FCC ' s  UHF Task Force,  or 
any members of the staff of the FCC . 
1.  For a more thorough discussion of the development and implica-
tions of the local service doctrine , see R. G.  Noll , M. J .  Peck and 
J.  J .  McGowan , Economic Aspects of Television Regulation, Brookings , 1973 . 
2 .  There is some evidence that t elevision advertising has reduced 
competit ion in a few industries . For example , televised sports has been 
cited as the cause of increased concentration in the beer industry 
because the number of opportunities to sponsor a sports broadcast are 
limited , and because national and regional networks give large firms an 
advertising advantage over small ones . See Ira Horowitz , "Sports 
Broadcasting , "  in R. G. Noll , Government and the Sports Business ,  
Brookings , 1974.  
3 .  The person who thought o f  this approach was Dr . Raymond Wilmotte, 
the coordinator of an internal FCC Task Force to study UHF allocation. 
4 .  See D .  McFadden , "Conditional Logit Analysis o f  Qualitative Choice 
Behavior" , in P. Zarembka , ed . ,  Frontiers in Econometrics , Academic Press , 
197 3 .  
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5.  McFadden , .£E..:._ cit. , has proved this result . He further shows 
that these choice probabilities satisfy certain desirable axioms . In our 
case the relevant axioms can be translated as (1) the probabilities are 
strict ly positive and (2)  the relative odds of choosing an allocation in 
one market over one in a second market are independent of the presence or 
absence of an unchosen alternative allocation in a third market . 
6 .  An oversimplified example would take Xi to be a three element 
vector containing populat ion , total number of commercial stations , and 
total number of noncommercial stations in market i .  
7 .  In the simpler versions , at least one of the following 
differences in the experiment was introduced : subj ects allocated only 
UHF tokens , the VHF/UHF distinction among stations initially allocated 
to a city was not made, and the populations of the four cities were not 
changed when the game was reinitialized . Thus , in the simplest vers ion , 
subj ects were told that each city had a particular population and a 
particular distribution among commercial network affiliates, commercial 
independents ,  and noncommercial stations . The subj ect was told that the 
first three commercial allocat ions would be networks and subsequent 
commercial allocat ions would be independents .  The subj ect was then 
asked to allocate addit ional stations among the four cities, indicat ing 
commercial or noncommercial status , with no reference being made t o  the 
location of the station in the spectrum. 
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8 .  An alternative procedure for guaranteeing independence would be
�o ask for a single assignment in each trial and run many trials with 
varying initial conditions . But the time constraints and observation 
requirements noted make this· approach not viable . 
9 .  The UHF-VHF distinction was not made in the dependent variable.  
The reason was that in nearly all cases the four VHF allocations were 
made firs t ,  followed by a series of UHF allo cations . Thus , by treating 
allocations of VHF and UHF stations as simply a homogeneous commodity 
("stations " ) , the model assumes that the market and type of the next 
allocation does not depend on whether the next allo cation must be UHF . 
This is probably incorrect for the mix of s tations determines the kind of 
programming a new UHF station will offer. Unfortunately the number of 
! observations available prevents including the UHF-VHF distinction among 
! the dependent variables . 
10.  Subj ects XXIV and XXVII have small , statistically -insignificant 
coefficients on the variable measuring the number of existing commercial 
VHF stations in the equation for commercial assignments ; however the 
coefficients for commercial UHF stations are strongly negative in beth cases . 
11 . Table 6 data are from trial . 2B which had a very egalatarian and 
relatively small initial allocation. All but one of the six commissioners 
opted for a commercial station to the largest market as the first 
assignment . In trials with initial allocations reflecting population 
sizes , subj ects were more diverse in first round assignments . In one 
trial , for example , the six commissioners split 2-2-2 among three 
alternatives . 
4 9  
12 . The normalization used is admittedly arbitrary but clearly 
some normalization is required to make estimated scores S . . = S� X .
ti] J ti
comparable between subj ects . Even for a single subj ect , the conditional 
logit formulation implicitly pre-normalizes both the origin and scale o f  
the true preference scores so that the estimated scores contain only 
ordinal information. 
1 3 .  One might erroneously conj ecture that , even i f  subj ects 
made choices according to different preference functions , estimates 
attained from pooled data might represent the "average preference function" 
in some sens e .  A demonstration that logit coefficient estimates in such 
a case are not consistent for the meaning of the true coefficients , even 
to the extent that they may exhibit the wrong sign asympttotically , is 
found in D .  Grether and F .  Nelson , "The Effects of Pooling Across 
Populations on Estimates of Qualitative Response Models , "  
mimeo, California Institute o f  Technology , Fall 197 8 .  
14 . The data reported here , having been obtained from one at 
a time assignments ,  is not appropriate for making hard inferences about 
"bundles" of simultaneous allocations . 
15 . The results were identical after six ,  twelve and eighteen 
allocations , and differed by only one allocation after three ,  nine , 
and fifteen assignments .  
Appendix A 
STATION ALLOCATION EXPERIMENT 
* 
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
TELEVISION PREFERENCE SURVEY 
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The FCC is studying alternative ways to use and manage the 
portion of the spectrum that is allocated to television broadcasting . 
In the past , television channels have been assigned on the basis of 
engineering constraints ,  designed to prevent stations from interfering 
with one another , and economic considerations , related to how many 
stations each city or market can support . A factor that has not been 
considered , and one that we feel is very important , is the distribution 
of "program alternatives " from the viewer ' s  point of view. By program 
alternatives , we mean the number of different programs from which a 
viewer can select at any given time . The number of program alternatives 
available in a market is equal to the number of stations broadcasting in 
that market . 
Determining what is an acceptable distribut ion of program 
alternatives is a matter of individual judgment . The method we have 
chosen to find out what would be considered a good distribution is to 
ask a number o f  "wise people" to respond to the survey described below. 
An analysis of the results of the survey will give us an idea of the
distributions most likely to be preferred . 
* 
Raymond Wilmotte and Gail Crotts of the FCC assisted in the 
preparation of these instructions . 
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In the survey ,  you will be asked to distribute program 
alternatives to four hypothetical television markets .  The only 
difference among the markets is their population s ;  they are assumed to 
have roughly the same social and d emographic mix of citizens . The 
survey consists of several tasks . In the first task, the populations 
o f the four markets will be : 
Market A 
Market B 
Market C 
Market D 
5 , 000 , 000 
1 , 50 0 , 000 
400 , 000 
100 , 000 
These population figures will be changed slightly each time you take 
the survey . 
For each task, you will begin with an initial allocation of 
VHF and UHF channels among the four cities . You will then be asked to 
allocate additional channels to the four markets , one at a time , 
until you are asked to stop assigning channels or until you believe that 
all four markets have enough program alternatives and that the remaining 
channels should be used for other communications services . Since you 
may be asked to stop at any time , it is important that each assignment 
of a station to a city be the most important and highly valued assignment 
that could be made. 
You will also be asked to determine the particular kind of 
television station (program alternative) that will be permitted on each 
channel assignment . A channel may be used for either commercial or non­
commercial service . When you assign a particular channel ,  you must 
designate whether it is for commercial or non-commercial use . For the 
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purpose of the assignment process , assume that the first three commercial 
assignments you make in each market will always be network affiliates ; 
any remaining commercial assignments will be commercial independent stat ions . 
To facilitate the allocation process,  you have been provided with 
a table that has two columns for each market , one column for commercial 
stations and the other for non-commercial . Each time you take the survey , 
an initial number of stations will already be in place : the blue chips 
represent VHF channels and the white chips represent UHF channels . You 
will be provied with a number of additional chips of each color . 
At each step in the allocat ion process , place a chip in one of 
the eight columns , thereby indicating which type of station you are 
creat ing and in which size city it is to be placed . Proceed with the 
allocation until you exhaust all chip s ,  you believe that all cities have 
enough t elevision and the remaining channels should be assigned for other 
communication purposes , or you are told to stop allocating channels . 
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ORAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
The purpose of this survey is to det ermine your preferences 
with respect to the kinds of programming options available to television 
viewers . One way of grouping programs is according to the type of 
stations over which they are broadcast : commercial networks ; commercial 
independents ; and public/educational stations . The FCC has the power to 
influence the availability of these three types of program alternatives 
by its decisions on spectrum allocation and license awards . 
We would like your opinion on the best distribution by size 
of market of these types of stations . We are interested in what national 
distribution of stations would produce the greatest viewer satisfaction . 
Please read the instructions , and then we will see if you have 
any questions before you respond to the survey . 
After answering any questions , then remind the player that : 
1 .  I t  is important for him/her t o  place the alternatives 
in the order of importance . That is , when a chip is played , it 
should be as though this was the last choice that could be made . 
It is not , therefore , required that one market be taken care of 
before moving to another , and it is not necessary to play all of 
one type of program alternative before going to the next type. 
In light of the original allocation and the further allocations 
you have mad e ,  what , in your opinion, is the next best solution? 
2 .  Keep in mind that we are interested in your opinion of 
the best distribution strictly from the viewer ' s  point of view 
his or her personal satisfaction . 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPERIMENTER 
The Station Allocation Game is intended to be administered 
by an experimenter who is fully aware of its structure and purpose. 
Subj ects are likely to have questions during the course of the game , 
and in any event need to have their actions carefully monitored . 
The most important j ob of the experimenter is to record all 
allocations by the subject accurately . The subj ect and the experimenter 
should be close enough together that the experimenter can easily ob serve 
the actions of the subj ect without interfering with the subj ect ' s  concen­
tration and physical movements . Do not play vulture and hover over the 
subj ect ; instead inobtrusively settle yourself in a spot that is convenient 
for observation. 
The experimenter should be equipped with plenty of paper and 
writing instruments so that the game is guaranteed to continue to conclu­
sion without interruption . The allocations should be recorded as follows . 
Firs t ,  at the top of the first page of your notes write the name and title 
of the subj ect and the exact time that the experiment begins . The beginning 
of the experiment is the time that the instructions for the subj ect are 
given , and after small talk and introductions are over . Second , when the 
subj ect begins the first allocation program, write down the exact time 
just below the time that the instructions changed hands.  Third , begin a 
column of recorded allocations by writing the Task Number of the allocation 
activity that the subj ect is doing -- the first time through , that will be 
Task la. Beneath the task number , begin recording the allocations in the 
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following manner : number each allocation of a channel consecutively , and 
next to the appropriate number write the city in which the channel was 
assigned , whether the assignment was commercial or noncommercial , and 
whether the assignment was UHF or VHF . For example , suppose a subj ect 
began Task la by assigning a commercial UHF to B ,  then a noncommercial UHF 
to C ,  and then a commercial UHF to A .  The first page o f  the record o f  the 
experiment would then appear as follows : 
John Q . '  Subj ect 
President of the United States 
Task la 
1. B Commercial UHF 
2 .  C Noncommercial UHF 
3 .  A Commercial UHF 
Instruction s :  3 : 42 p .m. 
Begin: 3 : 56 p .m. 
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Allow the subj ect to cont inue allocating stations for a 
minute or two before calling a stop to the task. Subj ects are likely 
to make their allocat ions more quickly as the game proceeds , so you may 
take this into account in calling stop . In order to encourage the 
subj ect to take seriously the possible imminence of your calling stop , 
be sure to stop Task la relatively quickly -- at the end of about 75 
seconds or after 8 o r  so allocations , whichever comes first . For 
subsequent games , call stop after about twenty allocations or two 
minutes , whichever comes first . In all cases , do not stop each task 
at exactly the same allocation number of the same amount of elapsed 
time . Finally, after you stop a task, write down the exact t ime that 
you called stop j ust below the last entry recording the final allocation 
for that task. Continue on to the next task, repeating the same pro­
cedure that you followed for the first . When you have concluded the 
last task, write down the t ime that the subj ect finished it , and ask 
the subj ect if he or she has any additional comments to make about the 
game . Record as exactly as you can any comments ,  suggestions or 
criticisms . At the bottom of the page , print your name so that we can 
contact you in case we have any questions about your records . 
A few matters of good practice for conducting an experiment 
of this sort are as follows : 
1 .  D o  not try t o  conserve paper - - the most important duty 
you have is to maintain a clear, complete record of the 
experiment ; 
2 .  Try to label and number all records so that others can 
easily interpret your records -- e . g . , remember to number 
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the pages o f  your records and t o  write down task number s ;  
3 .  Do not interfere with the decisions o f  the subj ect in any 
way do not discuss his or her allocations as they are taking 
place, and do not engage in discussion in any general way about 
the comparat ive values of different kinds of stations ; and 
4 .  Answer all questions about the procedures o f  the game as 
clearly and politely as possible,  but avoid engaging in needless 
small talk -- it affects the concentration of the subj ect . 
After the sub j ect has read the instructions , be sure that two 
points are complet ely understood by repeating them orally : _  
1.  Each allocation i s  to be made a s  if i t  were the last , a s  well 
it might be because you might call stop at any point ; and 
2 .  No particular category of assignments need be exhausted 
before allocation begins in another category; e . g . , the subj ect
may int ersperse allocat ions among cities , between commercial and 
noncommercial categories , and , when VHF allocations are available , 
between UHF and VHF . 
Before proceeding with the game , be sure to ask the subj ect if there are 
any questions . 
Population: 
VHF 
UHF 
VHF 
UHF 
Population: 
VHF 
UHF 
VHF 
UHF 
Population: 
VHF 
UHF 
VHF 
UHF 
Population: 
VHF 
UHF 
VHF 
UHF 
Market A 
5 , 000, 000 
Comm. Public/ 
Educ . 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
200 , 000 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 , 200, 000 
1 0 
1 0 
3 1 
0 1 
150 , 000 
1 1 
0 0 
2 0 
0 0 
SET-UPS FOR EACH SURVEY 
Market B 
1 , 500, 000 
Comm. Public/ 
Educ . 
2 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
3 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
400 , 000 
1 
0 
1 
0 
7 5 , 000 
0 
1 
0 
0 
4 , 000, 000 
2 1 
1 0 
3 0 
2 0 
Market C 
400 , 000 
Comm. Public/ 
Educ . 
2 0 
0 1 
2 1 
1 0 
6 , 000 , 000 
2 1 
1 1 
2 1 
0 0 
1 
500, 000 
1 
1 0 
3 0 
1 1 
1 , 800 , 00G 
1 1 
1 0 
3 0 
1 0 
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Market D 
100 , 000 
Comm. Public/ 
Educ. 
1 0 
1 0 
2 0 
0 0 
1 , 800 , 000 
2 1 
0 1 
2 1 
0 0 
4 , 500 , 000 
2 0 
1 2 
3 2 
1 1 
300 , 000 
1 1 
1 0 
2 1 
0 0 
